Abstract-The leak resistant arithmetic in RNS was introduced in 2004 to randomize RSA modular exponentiation. This randomization is meant to protect implementations on embedded device from side channel analysis. We propose in this paper a faster version of the approach of Bajard et al. in the case of right-to-left square-and-multiply exponentiation. We show that this saves roughly 30% of the computation when the randomization is done at each loop iteration. We also show that the level of randomization of the proposed approach is better than the one of Bajard et al. after a few number of loop iterations.
I. INTRODUCTION
RSA cryptosystem is one of the most used public key cryptosystem. The basic operation in RSA encryption or signature is the modular exponentiation. Specifically, given an RSA modulus N , a message X and an exponent E, we have to compute X E mod N . In practice N, X and E are integers of bit size 2048 − 4096. The exponentiation can be computed with a few thousands modular multiplications and squarings with the square-and-multiply algorithm.
When such a computation is done on an embedded device it is under the threat of side channel analysis. Such attacks monitor power consumption [9] , electromagnetic emanation [11] or computation time [10] and then try to extract the secret key from leaked information in such data. The simplest attack is the simple power analysis (SPA [9] ) which threatens implementations based on square-and-multiply algorithm and such that squaring and multiplication have different power traces. Indeed, an attacker can decompose the power trace into the sequence of traces corresponding to squarings and multiplications. Then he can deduce the sequence of bits of the exponent since a multiplication is computed only when the bit exponent e i = 1. SPA can be easily defeated by using a regular exponentiation algorithm like the square-and-multiply-always proposed by Coron in [5] or the Montgomery-ladder [7] .
Differential and correlation power analyses (DPA and CPA) are more advanced attacks: they can threaten implementations protected with a regular exponentiation algorithm. The idea is to guess the bits of the exponent sequentially and for each guess we compute the data in the next loop iteration of an exponentiation. The correct guess leads to data which are correlated to the power trace. If we have a large number of power traces, a statistical analysis accurately determines this correlation and we can proceed to the guess of the next bit.
Such attacks are generally defeated by randomizing data and exponentiation. Coron suggests in [5] to randomize the exponent by adding a random multiple of φ(N ) = (q − 1)(p−1) (p and q are the prime factors of N ) or to randomize the message X by multiplying it by a random multiplicative mask. In [2] , the authors propose a randomization based on modular arithmetic in residue number system (RNS). RNS is based on the Chinese remainder theorem: given t pairwise coprime moduli m i , an integer X is represented by its t residues modulo m i , i = 1, . . . , t. Modular arithmetic is implemented in this system by a modified version of the modular multiplication of Montgomery [12] . The basic idea of [2] is to randomize the set of moduli m i : this leads to a randomization of the computations and also of the multiplicative factor induced by Montgomery modular multiplication. The authors in [2] proposed to use this randomization all along the exponentiation to get a stronger counter-measure against DPA and CPA.
In this paper we propose a modified version of the counter-measure of [2] . Specifically, we consider the rightto-left version of the square-and-multiply-always exponentiation. We remove an Update operation which was initially used in [2] to keep the data in the correct Montgomery representation. This reduces the complexity of the randomization. Also, this modifies the form the multiplicative mask of the data involved in the exponentiation algorithm. We study this mask and give a strategy to remove it at the end of the exponentiation. We also evaluate the level of randomization induced by this modified version of the modular exponentiation with leak resistant arithmetic. This paper is organized as follows: In Section II we briefly review modular exponentiation and side channel analysis. In Section III we review the Montgomery multiplication in residue number system and the randomization based on leak resistant arithmetic [2] . In Section IV we provide our modified randomized exponentiation algorithm. In Section V we evaluate the level of randomization of the proposed approach and compare it to [2] . Finally, in Section VI we give some concluding remarks.
II. MODULAR EXPONENTIATION AND SIDE CHANNEL

ANALYSIS
The main operation in RSA protocols is the modular exponentiation: given a modulus N , an exponent E and X ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} we have to compute R 0 = X E mod N . This exponentiation can be computed with a sequence of squarings and multiplications using the so-called square-and-multiply approach. This approach reconstructs the exponent bit after bit either from left-to-right or from right-to-left. The right-to-left version computes sequentially X 2 , X 
When such algorithms are implemented on an embedded device they can be threatened by side channel analysis. Such attacks monitor either the computation time [10] , power consumption [9] or electromagnetic emanation [11] to derive the secret exponent E. The main attacks are the following:
Simple power analysis (SPA). This attack is based on the difference of the shapes of the power trace of a squaring and a multiplication. The power trace of an exponentiation can be decomposed as sub-traces corresponding to the sequence of squarings and multiplications computed during an exponentiation. Then the bits of the exponent can be determined as follows: if a squaring is followed by a multiplication the corresponding bit is "1" and if a squaring is followed by a squaring then the corresponding bit is "0".
To counteract SPA the basic approach is to break the correlation between the sequence of operations done in an exponentiation and the secret exponent. A first solution is the approach proposed by Coron in [5] which consists to add a dummy multiplication in the right-to-left exponentiation when the exponent bit is e i = 0. Indeed, the sequence of operations becomes a regular sequence of squarings always followed by a multiplication. This approach is called the square-and-multiply-always exponentiation. We provide in Algorithm 2 the right-to-left version of this method. Another popular regular exponentiation is the Montgomery-ladder which can be found in [7] .
Algorithm 2 Right-to-left Square-and-multiply-always Require: A modulus N , an integer X ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}
and E = (e −1 , . . . , e 0 ) 2 Ensure:
if e i = 0 then 4:
else 6:
Correlation and differential power analyses. These attacks are meant to recover the exponent E in the modular exponentiation even if it is protected against SPA with the use of the square-and-multiply-always scheme. The goal is to track the different values R
0 , . . . , R ( ) 0 taken by R 0 during the exponentiation. We assume that we know R (j) 0 for j = 0, . . . , i and e j for j = 0, . . . , i − 1:
known bits and data
By guessing the bit e i we can compute the next value R (i+1) 0 . The correct guess for e i+1 is the one such that to the power trace is correlated to R (i+1) 0
. In practice it is necessary to have multiple power traces in order to have good statistical evaluation of this correlation. This statistical evaluation of the correlation is done in [9] by computing a differential of the power traces and in [4] by computing the co-variance between the Hamming weight of R (i+1) 0 and the power traces.
Counter-measures. The main strategies were proposed by Coron in [5] and consist in randomizing the data and the computations at different levels. First Coron proposes to randomize the exponent E by adding a random multiple of φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1) where p and q are the two factors of N :
and E satisfies X E mod N = X E mod N . Coron also proposes to randomize the data by randomly blinding the message X: the message is multiplied by a random value α X = X × α mod N.
The message blinding can also be achieved by using a randomized representation of X. Indeed in [2] the authors suggest to use the residue number system (RNS) for the representation of integers modulo N . They could then randomize the representation by randomly permuting the moduli of the RNS basis.
Horizontal power analysis. Horizontal power analysis can be seen as a variant of SPA. This only requires a single power trace. The idea is to consider the end of the power trace of a multiplication involving R ei and the beginning of the power trace involving R ei+1 . If e i = e i+1 these two part of the power trace are correlated otherwise they are not correlated. If we do this analysis for all i can partition the bits of the exponent in two sets : one corresponding to bit 0 and the other to bit 1. This attack is a serious threat for embedded implementation of RSA protocols as it has been shown in [14] . Randomizing data representation all along the exponentiation can provide some robustness against such attack, but this has to be thoroughly evaluated and this out of the scope the paper.
III. LEAK RESISTANT MODULAR EXPONENTIATION IN RNS
We review in this section the Montgomery multiplication in residue number system. Then we will briefly present the approach of Bajard et al. [2] for the randomization of the modular exponentiation.
A. Modular multiplication in RNS
Montgomery modular multiplication. Let N be an RSA modulus and let X and Y be two integers such that 0 ≤ X, Y < N . Montgomery proposed in [12] a method for modular multiplication which avoids Euclidean division. This approach uses an integer A such that A > N and gcd(A, N ) = 1 and computes Z = XY A −1 mod N as follows:
In the above computation we have (XY + QN ) mod A = 0, this means that the division by A is exact in the computation of Z and then
For a long sequence of multiplications, we can use the following Montgomery representation
in order to absorb the factor A −1 appearing when we perform a Montgomery multiplication. Indeed, the Montgomery multiplication applied to X and Y outputs Z = XY A mod N , i.e., the Montgomery representation of the product of Z = X × Y mod N . In the sequel the factor A in (2) will be called the Montgomery factor.
Residue number system. Now we review the residue number system (RNS). Let a 1 , . . . , a t be t coprime integers.
In the RNS base
X can be reconstructed from the t residues x i as follows
where
. . , y t ) A be two integers given in an RNS base A. Then, the Chinese remainder theorem provides that an addition X +Y mod A or a multiplication X × Y mod A consists in RNS in t independent additions x i + y i mod a i and multiplications x i × y i mod a i for i = 1, . . . , t, respectively. These t operations modulo a i can be implemented in parallel since each operation modulo a i are independent from the others. (4) . The second RNS basis is necessary first because the product XY is roughly twice bigger than X and Y and secondly to perform the division by A which cannot be performed in A.
Then the first step of a Montgomery multiplication be-
To have a fully functional algorithm Posch and Posch needed some conversions, called base extensions (BE), to convert Q from A to B and to convert Z from B to A. Their Montgomery multiplication in RNS is shown in Algorithm 3.
In a base extension a BE A→B (resp. BE B→A a final reduction modulo A (resp. modulo B) has to be performed in order to have the correct value in [0, A[ (resp. [0, B[). This reduction can be done using the approach of Kawamura et al. [8] which computes the quotient of the reduction modulo A (resp. B) through a sequence of t additions. Another technique presented in [1] uses a redundant moduli to compute this quotient. In Arith 2011 the authors of [6] presented optimized versions of RNS multiplication for two base extensions [8] and [1] . A recent work [3] concerns RNS multiplication in a single RNS basis A for a prime P = A 2 − 2. We will not consider this later case here.
B. Leak resistant arithmetic (LRA)
In [2] the authors noticed that we can take advantage of the Montgomery multiplication in RNS to randomize a modular exponentiation. Specifically, when we compute a modular exponentiation using MM RNS for modular multiplication, the data are set in Montgomery representation X = X × A mod N and in RNS representation [ X] A∪B in the two bases A and B. The authors of [2] noticed that a way to randomize the data X is to randomly change the Montgomery factor A in X. They proposed to randomize this factor by randomly permuting the moduli of A ∪ B, and then by updating the Montgomery factor in X. They update this Montgomery representation in RNS as it is described in Algorithm 4.
Step 1 of Algorithm 4. computes X × A new × A old mod N and in Step 2 we get X × A new mod N .
Algorithm 4 Update(
This update of the Montgomery representation in RNS makes it possible to randomize any modular exponentiation in RNS. We provide in Algorithm 5 the randomized Rightto-left Square-and-multiply-always exponentiation in RNS. In this algorithm the data are randomized as follows: the variable Z is updated at each iteration by changing the Montgomery factor A old to A new using the Update algorithm. Then the two variables R 0 and R 1 are updated before each multiplication by Z: this update is from the RNS bases used the last time R 0 (resp. R 1 ) was updated: we denote these bases as A 0 and B 0 (resp. A 1 and B 1 ). This randomization requires four more multiplications per iteration: two per variable update (cf. Algorithm 3).
C. Negre and G. Perin presented in [13] a variant of the leak resistant approach described in [2] . They use a 
A ei , B ei ← A old , B old 10:
14:
spare set of moduli A and randomly swap moduli from A and A . Their approach is interesting when we randomly change only a small number of moduli. In the sequel we will consider only the RNS modular multiplication and RNS base randomization described in [2] . But the proposed strategy can also be adapted to the randomization described in [13] .
IV. PROPOSED RANDOMIZED RIGHT-TO-LEFT EXPONENTIATION IN RNS
In this section we present a modified version of the randomized right-to-left square-and-multiply-always approach reviewed in Subsection III-B. The main idea is quite simple: we remove the Update for the two variables R 1 and R 0 in order to reduce the cost of the randomization. This approach is shown in Algorithm 6.
In this randomized modular exponentiation (Algorithm 5) we do not control anymore the Montgomery factor in R 0 and R 1 . Let us see how to force this factor to be equal to one at end of the exponentiation. In the sequel we will consider only R 1 but the results obtained for R 1 are also valid for R 0 . Let R true for i and we prove it for i + 1. We process loop i to get R (i+1) 1 as follows:
• If e i = 0 then R 1 is not modified and then
Thus taking γ
j provides the correct result.
• If e i = 1 we have
) is a product of t moduli m j among M, i.e., the ones of A 
. Equation (6) also teaches us that γ (i) j evolves as a random walk, each step δ (i) j can be +1, −1 or 0. The probability of each step +1, −1 and 0 will be evaluated later in this paper.
In the sequel we will call 
A. Strategy to remove the final multiplicative mask
In the previous subsection we have seen how the γ (i) j evolves as i increases. We present in this section a strategy to remove the final multiplicative mask of R 1 at the end of Algorithm 6. Our goal is to force γ ( ) j = 0 for all j which induce a mask equal to 1. This proposed strategy reduces the level of randomization for the last /2 rounds of the exponentiation, but ensures that this final multiplicative mask is trivial and avoids a final correction.
We first notice that the multiplicative mask of R
is modified only at the loop iteration where e i = 1. Then let h E be the Hamming weight of the exponent E. The proposed strategy lets the exponent evolve freely for the h E /2 iterations such that e i = 1. Then for the last h E /2 iterations where e i = 1 we force the exponent γ 
The following lemma establishes how we force the exponents to converge towards 0 for the last h E /2 iterations where e i = 1. 
Then for j = 1, . . . , 2t and i k ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i hE } we have
Proof: The idea of the proof is quite simple: at iteration i k we have to be at distance at most h E − k from 0, i.e.,
Indeed from loop i k to loop i hE we can only do h E −k nonzero steps at the loop iterations i k+1 , . . . , i hE . This implies the following:
• If at step i k we are exactly at distance h E −k we have to make a non-zero step toward 0 ("-1" if γ
• If at step i k we are at distance h E − k − 1 we have to either stay at distance h E − k − 1 or make step toward 0 this is exactly what (iii) and (iv) do. This ensure that we will be at distance at most h E − k − 1 at loop i k+1 .
• Otherwise we can move freely by a step +1, 0 or −1. By induction on k we see that the claim of the lemma is satisfied. We now prove that the restrictions on the randomization of the bases A, B, A and B are always feasible. The non-trivial case are (i) and (iii). By symmetry, we focus only on (i). We assume that h E − k > 1, and we denote
If s < s we can check that (i) is feasible by compensating the operations in (i) on S by the opposite in S . If s > s we show that this never happens. We add 1 to γ (i k ) j for j ∈ S and subtract 1 at s places j ∈ S. We obtain a vector γ
The previous lemma shows that under the restrictions given by (i) to (iv) we ensure that all final exponents γ
The disadvantage of this approach is that it reduces the level of randomization in the second phase of the exponentiation i ≥ i hE /2 . But not too much since with our restriction the level of randomization of the second phase is somewhat symmetric the one in the first phase.
We can apply the same restriction to R 0 in order to have the same operations performed at each loop iteration. This would avoid any irregularity which could leak out some information. Table I contains the complexity of the proposed approach along with the one of [2] which was originally proposed for the Montgomery-ladder. The complexities in Table I shows that the proposed approach is always the best option: it saves 30% of the amount of computation. 
B. Complexity comparison
V. LEVEL OF RANDOMIZATION
The goal of this section is to evaluate the level of randomization induced by the multiplicative mask of R (i) 1 in our modified randomized modular exponentiation. Our goal is to evaluate an upper bound on the probability for any mask to be picked up. Afterwards we will be able to compare this randomization to the one in [2] . We first need to analyze the random behavior of the exponent γ
A. Random walk of the exponents γ (i) j
We first study the way the exponents γ
evolve during the proposed randomized exponentiation. We denote
2t ) the vector of the exponents of the multiplicative mask of R (i) 1 . We have already noticed that each γ (i) j for a fixed j behaves as a random walk for i = 1, 2, . . . , . From (5) and (6), we know that for any loop iteration γ
is chosen at random with the following probabilities:
(7) Indeed, we first notice that
c , the RNS bases used in iteration i, have all t elements. Now since the events {e i = 1}, {m j ∈ A (i) } and {m j ∈ A
1 } are independent we have:
The following lemma provides the probability P(γ 
i−2k+d (8) Proof: We consider the random walks which have k steps "1" and k − d steps "−1" and
The number of these random walks is
Each of these random walks has a probability of
i−2k+d . We get the probability P(γ
by summing over all acceptable values for k and this leads to (8) .
We can also evaluate the expected value E(γ j , k = 1, . . . , i with the probability distribution of (7). In other words:
And then the standard deviation is SD(γ
. . , i}, but it is more likely that its absolute value is less than √ i/2. The following lemma shows that for a fixed i, this probability P(δ 
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in the appendix.
B. Bounding the level of randomization
Let Γ ∈ Z 2t , then we denote σ(Γ) = 2t j=1 γ j . In this subsection we will first give the exact condition for a vector Γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ 2t ) ∈ Z 2t to be i-th term of a sequence of exponent vectors in Algorithm 6. In other words we will consider the vectors for which there exists a path
and σ(Δ (k) ) = 0. Our goal is to bound the probability to obtain a given multiplicative mask after a certain number of iterations. The following lemma states the basic result we will use to bound this probability. Γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ 2t ) be a vector that can be reached after i loop iterations. Then we have:
Lemma 4. Let
Proof: We can assume that we generate Δ (i) by sequentially generating δ (i) j , j = 1, . . . , 2t. Then the first steps δ j ( i) are generated independently to the first j − 1 already generated steps. For j > t the steps depends on the ones previously generated γ
This remark leads us to the following:
Now we combine the results of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 to get an upper bound on the probability to get Γ after i loop iterations:
C. Comparison
With the results of Subsection V-B we are able to compare the level of randomization of the proposed approach with the one of [2] . In [2] the multiplicative mask is taken at random in a set of 2t t masks, in other words, with a probability of 1/ 2t t . Then we can say that the level of randomization of the proposed approach after i loop iterations is better than the one of [2] if the probability to get any possible mask is smaller than 1/ 2t t . We were not able to compare these two probabilities formally. But we could compute a bound on this probability for a practical size of N , i.e., of bit length 2048, and with t = 64 (cf . Table II) . For a number of values for i we computed P(λ (i) = 0) using the formula of Lemma 2, we then could compute a bound of the probability P(Γ (i) = Γ) for any Γ with (9) . These values are reported in Table II. The probability for Montgomery-ladder with the randomization of [2] is the same for all iterations and is equal to 1/ 128 64 ∼ = 4.17 · 10 −38 . The values in Table II shows that we cannot assert that in the proposed approach the randomization is better for the first 10 loop iterations. But after the 10-th loop it becomes clearly better. This problem can be overcome by using the randomization of [2] for these 10 first loop iterations and then use our proposed approach for the other iterations. By symmetry we need to do the same for the last 10 iterations. The complexity of this combined approach would be increased by 40 multiplications (i.e. 4 × 10 for the first 10 loops and 4 × 10 for the last 10 loops for updating R 0 and R 1 ). The total cost of the proposed approach is then 8272 multiplications while the randomized Montgomery-ladder of [2] necessitates 12288 multiplications, in the meantime our approach provides a better level of randomization.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a faster version of the leak resistant square-and-multiply-always approach of [2] . We used a right-to-left version of the square-and-multiply exponentiation and remove the Update on the Montgomery factor of the two variables R 0 and R 1 . This lead to a reduction of the complexity. We also studied the impact of proposed modification on the randomization level. This analysis showed that the level of randomization is low for a few number of iterations. But this can be overcome by using the approach of [2] for these iterations. The proposed approach has also the advantage to offer a higher level of randomization after the small number of loop iterations. APPENDIX Proof of Lemma 3. Before proceeding to the proof we notice that P(λ • For i = 1 we have P(λ • We assume that the assertion is true for i − 1 and we prove it for i. We first prove for d > 0 and d + 1 ≤ i that P(λ • The other cases are either trivial or handled as above.
